INTRODUCTION
Collective action and property rights are able to shape peoples' livelihoods. Property rights shape peoples' claim on benefit streams out of their owned resources and have an impact on peoples' asset base. In a cross-country study Heitger (2003) shows that improved property rights have a strong positive impact on living standards. The better property rights are suited to address people's needs, the better their chance to shape their livelihoods and to escape poverty traps. Secure access to resources increases a household's capital base and will broaden (poor) people's capacities to engage in activities to improve their well-being. Effective collective action can also enable households to improve their well-being. Engaging in activities collectively can, for example, increase people's access to resources, secure against idiosyncratic shocks, or achieve common goals that are impossible to achieve at individual level. Thus collective action also becomes part of people's strategies to shape property rights and increase well-being.
Both property rights and collective action were severely challenged in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge regime. After democratic consolidation, attempts to (re-)create a legal framework that secures access to land and natural resources were made by the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and strongly supported by all major donors. Nevertheless the introduction of laws, decrees and sub decrees created new uncertainties among the rural poor and advantaged the more powerful (Global Witness, 2007) . Resource degradation and conversion of natural resources into arable land leaves Cambodia's rural poor with ever less options to derive income from these resources. Furthermore, a relatively slow rate of land titling in rural areas or clear demarcations leaves the poor, less powerful people vulnerable to land grabbing and exclusion from benefit streams out of common property. Collective action also still suffers from the Khmer Rouge legacy as large parts of traditional social ties such as mutual help, religious institutions and even family ties have been destroyed (Mehmet, 1997) . Collectivization under the communist regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea also left marks on Cambodians' willingness to cooperate at a larger extent in agriculture.
The objective of this case-study is to identify effective practices and policies that enhance the way in which cooperation/collective action and property rights are used to build up secure assets and income streams for the rural poor in Cambodia. In order to provide policy makers, community groups, civil society organizations and researchers with a better understanding on the property rights systems in place, the project assesses existing property rights systems in rural Cambodia to identify what benefit streams poor people can rely on for their livelihood. The project identifies forms and mechanisms of economic and social cooperation, how they influence property rights systems, and to what extent rural poor are part of village networks. Based on this assessment, the linkages between property rights, collective action, and poverty are analyzed. In addition, it explores what resources poor households use, by what property rights systems these resources are governed, and if collective action helps poor people to address their needs.
This study shows that mutual help, religious activities, and small scale associations are regaining ground in Cambodia. However, these associations, even though aiming to help the rural poor, actually cannot reach them properly. Poor people lack confidence to take part in those associations and sometimes are unable to use the services offered by them. 2 In addition, collective action to secure natural resources is not yet successful to address ongoing resource degradation. Formal, legally backed institutions lack local recognition and are thus unable to enforce rules set to protect the resource. Villages that mange their resources following traditional principles tend to cooperate better across village boundaries and are thus more successful in natural resource management. Nevertheless, they too are unable to protect them against interventions of outsiders.
3 Another explanation for low degrees of cooperation in natural resource management are low degrees of trust. Missing trust will have to be considered when implementing development projects on the ground.
THE CAMBODIAN BACKGROUND
Cambodia is a South-East Asian country with a Gross National Income per Capita of US$380 (World Bank, 2006) . Its main income source is agriculture (19.1 percent of GDP, 2005 current prices) 4 growing at a below average rate. Around 80 percent of the Cambodian population lives in rural areas, where 72.5 percent are employed in the agricultural sector. 5 In 2004, 35 percent of the Cambodian population lived below the national poverty line of US$0.45 per capita per day, with highest poverty incidence in rural areas. Based on 2004 data, 39 percent of the rural population are classified as poor, compared to 5 percent in Phnom Penh and 25 percent in other urban areas (World Bank, 2006) . Cambodians living in rural areas account for nearly 91 percent of the overall country's poor (World Bank, 2006) . This high level of poverty incidence has largely resulted from high population pressure in the rain fed lowlands on limited natural resources, 6 inadequate job opportunities and low capabilities, insecurity on access to land and other productive assets, continuing exclusion of poor communities from economic growth, and high vulnerability due to 2 As an example: Rice banks are not suited to generate extra income for landless or land-poor households. They provide rice for a lower interest as the surplus gained through the harvest. However, landless and land-poor often are not able to generate the surplus but rather borrow for consumption purposes. They are only able to pay back the loan if they are able to generate enough money from other income sources.
3 People considered to be outsiders can be understood as people that migrate temporarily to other districts or provinces or powerful people that do not have close ties to the villages. natural disasters, violence, and economic shocks (EIC, 2005; World Bank, 1999 
Rural Economy
Most of the population lives in low arable plains crossed by many rivers, with the two most important being the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. Natural resources play an important role in securing livelihoods for those poor as they contribute to a large share to household incomes (World Bank, 2006) and are able to contribute to poverty reduction if secure access and sustainable use is given (Hach and Sothea, 2004) . In Cambodian rural areas natural resources contribute to multiple uses for income generation of multiple users, ranging from collecting non-timber forest products for subsistence to additional income generation through logging at different scales. Access to these natural resources is, however, defined by multiple and often overlapping rights, both private and common, which are in turn governed by formal and informal patterns of cooperation. Therefore, the ability to decide and act together plays an important role in improving rural livelihoods. Privately owned parcels of forests do not inhibit villager's rights to gather mushrooms, hunt animals, or graze cattle within the forested area as long as timber or other commercially used products remain untouched. Flooded rice fields are open to villagers to catch crabs or small fish in the fields and become common grazing ground after they have been harvested. There are also concession systems in place that are granted to private parties by the state for economic exploitation. Here, access and extraction rights are regulated through different legal texts. 8 There are overlapping 4 Agriculture is followed by garment industries (13.2 percent of GDP) and fisheries (9.8 percent of GDP).
5 Employment in the agricultural sector includes employed rural laborers as well as self employed and unpaid family workers. The share of people employed in overall Cambodia is 67.6 percent. 6 According to UNFPA (2005) Cambodia's population growth rate is 2.4 percent, which is relatively high compared with neighboring countries where population is growing by 1.4 percent in Vietnam and 1.0 percent in Thailand. Furthermore, Cambodian population is less concentrated in the cities than its neighbors' population.
7 Such shocks are consumer or oil price shocks and deteriorating terms of trade for exported goods. 8 In the fishery sector, for example, a fishing concession system is in place, where the Department of Fisheries (DoF) as part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) grants concessions for commercial fishing. The Fisheries Law (2006) defines rules of access, boundaries, user rights, authorities, and enforcement. It is based on the separation of the fishery domains into industrial fishing, preserved fishing, and subsistence fishing areas. Fishing lot "owners" who lease those lots for a two years period do have the right to exclusively fish in their lot, excluding the area that is reserved as "open access area". Medium scale fishing is allowed in public domains (such as outside fishing lots and protected areas) after paying for a licence that grants access rights. Fishing lots and medium scale fisheries are prohibited during the "closed" season. Subsistence fishing is allowed in all public domains throughout the whole year and within the lots during the "closed" season (McKenney and Tola, 2002). However, there are informal cooperation schemes that affect subsistence rights in floodplains, where agricultural land or forests are (temporarily) flooded and become fishing habitats. In these areas agriculture, fisheries and forestry compete for scarce resources: water used for irrigation may decrease fish yields; extensive harvest of forest products or land clearings destroys fish habitats; pesticides and fertilizers used in agriculture reduce water quality and thus fish yields.
As an outcome of the process of political stabilization and re-establishing government institutions in the country from the mid 1990s on, cooperative management approaches were recognized (or even re-invented) by the government, civil society organizations, and the private sector as potentially successful governance patterns not only for individual livelihood generation but also to achieve a more sustainable resource use. As an example, traditional forms of cooperation in Cambodia are centred on the pagoda, the Buddhist temple. They are based on the donations villagers give to a pagoda committee. In the first place, they provide for the monks' food but are also used to repair the pagoda, establish rice banks, and give food and shelter to the most vulnerable villagers. Several NGOs thus use pagodas as an entry point to introduce or support not only socioeconomic self-help groups but also to raise awareness for sustainable resource use, to replant forests, or to initiate resource management organizations. In the fisheries and forestry sector the RGC aims to hand over natural resource management to local users. The Fishery Communities 9 set up for this purpose shall manage, protect, develop, and use the fishing resource in a sustainable way. With the instrument of Community Forests 10 the state recognizes and aims to ensure traditional forest use rights of villages and communes.
Civil War
To understand the sensitivity of these recent initiatives and the high risk of failure in their implementation, it is important to take Cambodians recent history of civil war into account. In 1975 the Khmer Rouge came into power and introduced an agrarian totalitarian communism to a dimension not known before (Chandler, 1996) . Cambodians were organized in brigades that had to provide forced labor under unbearable conditions. The Khmer Rouge abolished private ownership, fishery negatively: fishing lot owners do cooperate (illegally) with the military to inhibit subsistence fishing even when subsistence fishing is allowed within the lots (Van Acker, 2003). In the forest concession system, the MAFF gives concessions to private companies that then exercise exclusive rights on the resource. These systems has been widely criticized as the concessions have been awarded without consideration of environmental and social impacts, and lack clear boundaries and evaluation criteria for sustained yield (Fraser et al. 2000 , Global Witness, 2007 . 9 The term Fishery Community is used in the 2006 Fisheries Law to describe formal institutions that are registered with the Cambodian government. In the text the term "Fishery Community Organization" will be used to refer to those management institutions only. 10 Community Forests are defined by the 2002 Forestry Law as an "area of state forest granted under an agreement to manage and utilize the forest in a sustainable manner between the Forest Administration and a local community or organized group of people living within or near the forest area and dependent upon it for subsistence and traditional use". (Article 5/8) In the text the term "Community Forest Organization" will be used to refer to institutions that are registered with the government or are in the registration process.
literally destroyed existing infrastructure including written evidence on land ownership or use rights, and systematically killed intellectuals, government employees, and monks. Cooperative institutions related to religious services and the life around the Buddhist pagodas were abolished (Mehmet, 1997) . It is estimated that over one million citizens 11 died during the Khmer Rouge regime (Chandler, 1996) . In 1979, Vietnamese troops overcame the Khmer Rouge regime and introduced an economic model based on the ideas of a centrally planned economy and of state owned rural producer cooperatives. Violent conflicts continued in different parts of the country, and only after elections in 1993 Khmer Rouge accepted to turn in their weapons. Currently Cambodia superficially appears to be a peaceful country; however, the years of unrest left marks on Cambodia's physical, human, and social capital with a painful reconstruction process still ongoing.
Legal Pluralism
Practised property rights systems include not only the legal foundations of a state but also take informal rights into account such as statutory, traditional, and customary rights. This coexistence of different sources of rights is referred to as legal pluralism (Griffiths, 1986; Merry, 1988; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002) . Legal pluralism exists in Cambodia, as Simbolon (2002) states relating this to its specific socio-political history. Property rights have developed under the different regimes Cambodians faced over time: traditional Khmer property rights were similar to usufruct, where the king appointed persons to use and benefit from a piece of land. French colonisation introduced private property rights and individual land ownership in Cambodia. After they left, private property was appreciated by the elite but "… the Khmer rural masses did not necessarily embrace it" (Simbolon, 2002: 11) . Later, under the Khmer Rouge regime private property was abolished and peoples' rights to draw benefit from land were transformed to the right to only work on it. A vast displacement of the population based on forced resettlement alienated Cambodians from traditional claims to their land. However, during the Vietnamesesupported People's Republic of Kampuchea the collectivization of property continued as part of a socialist economic model but included different levels of individually secured use rights. Restricted private ownership was reintroduced from 1989 on, when Cambodia started to transform its socialist system to a market economy (Williams, 1999) . Constant changes in Cambodian property-related law created a legal plurality itself, with traditional and statutory rights co-existing (such as the Land Law of 2003, a vast legislation on natural resources together with reacknowledged indigenous, unwritten rights). Degen et al. (2000) find that existing rights rather strengthen the powerful than protect the powerless effectively. Today, the legal framework is still weak with different components developing at different speeds (van Acker, 2003). 11 More cautious estimates suggest that around 900.000 people, then one eighth of the country's population, lost their lives during the four years of the Khmer Rouge Regime (Golzio, 2003) .
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A SYNOPSIS
Benefits from economic growth have often bypassed the poor. Evidence indicates that changes in social and economic processes are necessary to reduce poverty (Wolfensohn and Bourguignon, 2004) and that the distribution of benefits from growth remains crucial to achieve this goal. In this context, the key role played by property rights and collective action in generating well-being, and how to make benefits out of property rights and collective action available to the (rural) poor remains a challenge for research. To understand how property rights and collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, a conceptual framework is guiding the case-study in rural Cambodia, building upon the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005; Oakerson, 1992) . This framework (Figure 1 ) separates in a 'context' section and 'action arena' section. The 'context' represents initial socio-economic and political conditions shaping the opportunities of people for possible actions: (1) the asset base; (2) shocks and risks; and (3) political structure of a society. The key problem of lack of 12 A more detailed discussion of the conceptual framework is presented in: di Gregorio et al. (2008) .
Evaluative Criteria of outcomes:
• 
Action Arena
assets and weak asset accumulation for the poor highlights the importance of enabling property rights, accessible and enforceable for them. The second set of conditions refers to the vulnerability of people to fall into poverty and the need to create coping mechanisms. Manifested legal structures and power relations generally disadvantage the poor. These three factors affect institutions of property rights and collective action which are themselves part of the initial context. A major part of empirical data from the exploratory study on property rights and collective action in rural Cambodia will concentrate on these contextual factors.
The 'action arena' illustrates how individuals, the state, and other actors can make use of institutions of property rights and collective action, as well as change these institutions to reduce poverty. Nevertheless, not all people have access to these institutions or are willing to engage in them. Poor education, exclusion from social groups, and landlessness--as in Cambodia--are reasons that prevent people from engaging. While the context focuses on initial conditions that affect peoples' actions, people's agency and their interactions with others shape their future. Each action situation is shaped by social rules about behavior, use of resources, decision-making mechanisms, and, of course, by contextual conditions. The actors, their action resources, and applicable rules all delimit the space within which actors make choices. Each actor will have different limitations and opportunities within different action situations according to contextual conditions and to the position of other actors involved. In the action arena, parties act independently. They discuss, negotiate, cooperate, and challenge each other.
Over time, specific actions create stabilized patterns of interaction. They refer to regularized and observable behavioural outcomes of actors. In these interaction processes, actors reinforce existing institutions or create even new ones. Thus, on the one hand, existing institutions delineate the socio-economic space within which actors make choices and take action. On the other hand, while institutions constrain actions a priori, they may alter institutions ex-post, thus changing initial conditions through feedback loops. In a final step patterns of interactions lead to outcomes. They can either refer to direct effects on well-being (for example, income increases) or to changes in institutions themselves (for example, stronger bargaining power of villagers through associations). A number of feedback loops might be needed before substantial institutional changes will affect the situation of the poor through improved social inclusion, income, health, and reduced vulnerability, which can finally serve as evaluative criteria to assess outcomes in terms of poverty reduction.
CAMBODIAN CASE STUDY: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Objectives
Based on the problem assessment and the conceptual framework developed, the goal of the Cambodian case study is to identify effective practices and policies that enhance the way in which cooperation/collective action and property rights are used to build up secure assets and income streams for the rural poor. In order to provide policy makers, community groups, civil society organizations and researchers with a better understanding on the property rights systems in place, the project assesses existing property rights systems in rural Cambodia to identify on what benefit streams poor people can rely for their livelihood. The project identifies forms and mechanisms of economic and social cooperation, how they influence property rights systems, and to what extent rural poor are part of village networks. Based on this assessment, the linkages between property rights, collective action, and poverty are analyzed. In addition, it explores what resources poor households use, by what property rights systems these resources are governed, and if collective action and helps poor people to address their needs.
Methodology
A mix of methods of empirical research was employed. Interviews and group discussions with NGOs, donor agencies, and ministerial staff were used to identify research sites. These sites have been selected with regard to different experience with formalized institutions for cooperation, the endowment with natural resources, and accessibility. 13 The selected research sites are situated in central Cambodia, in the provinces of Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham, both located in the major floodplain zones (Figure 2 ). With support of collaborating organisations, four villages have been chosen: Chrang Krohom (CK) and Leuk (LK) in Kampong Thom, and Krorsang (KS) and Svay Teap (ST) in Kampong Cham. Villages differ in the kinds of resources used, accessibility, 14 income sources, natural resource management institutions, and in the degree villages are supported by external actors such as NGOs. None of the villages is equipped with electricity or sanitation infrastructure but all have access to a school for primary education.
15 Table 1 gives an overview of village characteristics as stated above. 13 Weak physical infrastructure and persisting security problems also influenced site selection.
14 Accessibility is restricted by temporary isolation during the rainy season, lack of streets for four wheeled vehicles, distance to main market places, and poor availability of public transportation. 15 The village of ST cannot provide education to their villagers currently, as they have established a self organized school for which no teacher is available at the moment. Data collection at the different sites included: (1) semi-structured interviews with key informants to gather information on village structure; 16 (2) a household survey; 17 (3) group discussions and resource maps to identify changes in the resource and to assess property rights of different user groups; and (4) experimental evidence to asses trust levels in the villages. 18 Secondary data analysis was employed to fill gaps the field research could not address.
RESEARCH RESULTS
Household and Village Characteristics
The household survey compiles data of 146 households in all four villages. At least one fifth of each village's households were included in the survey. All villages are similar in their household characteristics. Table 2 gives therefore an overview of cross sectional data of these household characteristics. The average size of the households interviewed is 6 persons with an average educational level of 1.6 years in school. On average, 46.5 percent of the villagers engage in collective action. A very large share of the households diversifies its income from more than one source. The households also rely on natural resources 19 for livelihood generation. Table 3 gives an overview on income diversification in the study sites.
In Kampong Thom the villages of Chrang Krohom (CK) and Leuk (LK) use forest and water resources for subsistence and have been supported by international donors and NGOs. At least seven formal associations exist in CK offering credit and religious services, natural resource management, and advisory services to village authorities. In order to improve forest resource management, village authorities established a Community Forest Organization which is already in place but still lacks legal recognition. The goal of this forest committee is to protect the local forest against overexploitation and, where necessary, to start reforestation. Water resources are traditionally managed by the villagers themselves. However, there are efforts to further formalize existing water resource management: at the moment, the Village Committee 20 manages the resource and take actions when problems arise. Water resources management is mainly meant to guarantee sufficient water needed for agricultural activity but also intends to keep the fish stock at sustainable levels to ensure continuous income generation during the dry season. CK has been supported by donor agencies, NGOs, and a Cambodian major political party. Agricultural extension services, infrastructure improvement, and assistance to establish credit associations have been provided as well as proceedings to set up a Community Forest Organization. In contrast to CK, the village of LK manages both the communal forest and the local lake commonly by the village authorities of the three neighbouring villages that use these resources jointly. The forest not only serves as an important resource for income generation but also as a social space for religious festivities that are jointly celebrated with neighbouring villages.
Four formal associations are active in LK. They cover credit and religious service provision and advise the village authorities. LK received support from donor agencies and NGOs for agricultural extension and to establish and develop rice banks. Funds are raised to finance common activities to improve infrastructure. In Kampong Cham Province the villages of Krorsang (KS) and Svay Teap (ST) have been investigated. KS faced a major in-migration, with village population increasing by about 50 percent during the last five years. It only depends on forest resources for livelihood generation. The local forest is allocated to the commune and is hence used by several villages jointly. One association guarantees its members' access to credit. At commune level a Community Forest Organization is in place which aims to protect the forest against illegal deforestation and to provide subsistence income in particular for poor villagers. KS has been supported by national and international NGOs and government programs to establish a Community Forest Organization and a credit association, and received support to improve its accessibility. In contrast to all other villages, ST only recently started to receive governmental support for improving its accessibility. It uses forest and water resources that are both managed traditionally by village elders. The forest area is also used for religious festivities together with surrounding villages. There is one association in ST that was established to support women against domestic violence.
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Villages thus differ in the way they manage their natural resources and the extent to which people act collectively within a village. The following section will present more detailed findings on the role of property rights in natural resource management at the local level.
Property Rights, Natural Resource Use, and Cooperation: Processes and Actors
Secured access to land and other natural resources is of major importance for sustaining livelihoods in Cambodian rural areas: Rice cultivation and cash cropping (such as soybean, yam) are the main income sources to the rural population. Natural resources are mainly used by the rural poor to complement their small income. Therefore, this section will focus on access and use of natural resources first and then will give an overview about the impacts of resulting conflicts on people's livelihoods.
Natural resources such as forests and lakes, ponds and other water units are, as the Land Law (2001) states, owned by the state either as "public" or "private" state domain. Privatization of these resources is endorsed by the Land Law under very restricted conditions only (Kirk, 2004) . Complementary to property rights legislation, resource management is regulated in different laws, decrees, and regulations. It is executed by different government departments on provincial and district levels. 22 In all four villages (illegal) conversion of natural resources has been detected. 23 Natural resources in Cambodia are in fact already degraded, with most conversions starting around 1979 during the Pol Pot regime or right after its end. 24 A relatively new tool to address forest resource degradation are Community Forests 21 This association is actually not working. It was established externally by the Commune Council with insufficient training on the purpose and tasks of this association. The association leader could only vaguely describe the purpose of the association. 22 Cambodia is administratively divided into provinces, which, in turn, consist of several districts. A district combines several communes which consist of a number of villages being the smallest administrative entity. 23 There are, for example, activities to fill up lakes to grow more rice or to clear remaining forests for cropping purpose. 24 One exception is KS, where clearing began only recently in 2000 with immigration and completely changed traditional pattern of fallow cropping systems, where the forest was cleared for cropping and then left alone for three years to recover.
and Fishery Communities 25 that have been introduced by the RGC to hand over resource rights to local people and to initiate sustainable natural resource management. These new tools have been established or are being set up in two of the villages whereas the other two still manage their resources traditionally. According to the Law, each village can decide whether it wants to apply for a formalized community or not. The establishment of these organizations depends on whether legal knowledge of the existence of Community Forests or Fishery Communes was disseminated, whether human and financial resources are available in the villages, and whether the communes go through the registration process. 26 In addition, it depends on whether the resource is part of a natural reserve or an economic concession. 27 At the research sites where local authorities chose to set up Fishery Community or Community Forest Organizations the problems that arise during implementation are similar: (1) procedures to register the Community Organizations, as stated by members involved in the establishment of the Organizations, are very time consuming and impossible to be monitored by the applying villages or communes; (2) uncertainties exist about community boundaries that have to be jointly identified, clarified, and settled before the registration can be finalized; and (3) cooperation with other villages or communes is rather low and makes it difficult to include all user groups. As a result of these dimensions, no clear responsibilities exist during the time span between the application for and the finalization of the registration process for the Fishery Community or Community Forest Organizations. As a consequence, administration officers sometimes stop the ongoing processes arbitrarily on inspection tours leaving community members in uncertainty whether they are allowed to enforce not yet officially approved rules.
The villages of KS and CK decided to establish Community Organizations for natural resource management. In KS forest resources are rapidly decreasing even though a Community Forest Organization is in place. First clearings were done or tacitly protected by higher ranking people from the military being in clandestine contact with some villagers. Villagers opposing logging and tree cutting activities were threatened, even with arms. These patterns of pushing deforestation by mere force are still widely spread in rural Cambodia (see the AHRCHK website for reported cases 28 ). The cleared land has then been sold to immigrants, resulting in a remarkable population increase of more than 50 percent in the village during the last five years. In 2003, the village authorities of KS established a Community Forest Organization, but registration was finalized only in 2006. During the three 25 The Forestry Law states the possibility for local groups to manage their forests: "Community Forest means an area of state forest granted under an agreement to manage and utilize the forest in a sustainable manner between the Forest Administration and a local community or organized group of people living within or near the forest area and depend upon it for subsistence and traditional use" (Forestry Law, 2002: Article 5/8). These local user groups are often simply named Forest Community. 26 Registering processes are time consuming and require a certain degree of literacy in order to be able to negotiate with the provincial forest or fisheries administrations. They also consume significant financial resources as transportation to the provincial capital is necessary as well as to the resource site for demarcation. 27 In the latter cases the registration processes will depend on external support as different laws and ministries are involved, and complex legal knowledge is needed to be successful in the negotiating processes. 28 Asian Human Rights Commission: www.ahrchk.net years of unclear responsibilities to protect the forest against illegal logging, around fifty new houses were built within the area of the Community Forest Organization, and large parts of the local forests had already been turned into farmland. Clearings took place even though it was well known to all parties involved that damaging the forest resource was forbidden and the Community Forest area had already been provisionally marked as a protected area by the Community Forest Organization. During the registration process, migrants 29 who settled down within the forest turned it into agricultural and homestead land. These settlements hindered the original villagers 30 from continuing traditional fallow cropping. It further aggravated the existing pressure on local resources. 31 The ever-shrinking forest units continued to be of major importance to the original villagers as they rely on them for income generation. Even though the Community Forest Organization immediately reports to the local forest administration whenever rules are broken, 32 no impact on halting logging or the conversion of forests to agricultural land is observable. 33 Settling down in the Community Forest area remains unpunished for reasons that could not completely be assessed during the research. KS is also unable to cooperate with other villages that also heavily rely on the forest. KS authorities feel unable to inhibit the other villages' inhabitants to (ab-)use forest lands or to migrate to the Community Forest Organization area. As Community Forest Organization members point out, punishment of intruders is the right of the intruders' "home" authorities. In addition, newly settled villagers invite their kin and neighbours from their villages of origin to KS as their experience acquiring land through converting forests to arable land had been positive and assuming that there would still be more land available to be distributed by local authorities. This indicates that newcomers expect not to be punished for converting forests into arable land in the short run. 34 As a result, KS is still unable to keep migrants from settling within the forest and is still unable to prevent anyone from logging. As a consequence, the Community Forest Organization fails to protect its forest and to shift to a more sustainable forestry system. 29 The term migrants here refers to people coming from neighbouring villages and communes as well as to people from other districts and provinces. 30 The original villagers are understood as households that have been living in KS ever since they have been born and are still familiar with fallow cropping traditions. 31 The forest faced severe degradation already before migrants came to settle down as, due to population growth, some parts of the forest already were transformed for cash cropping purposes. Additionally, the military logged precious woods out of the dense forest leaving a disrupted ecosystem. 32 Only the Forest Administration is able to arrest people or secure evidence to punish crimes against Forestry Law.
33 This is due to a time lag from the time logging is reported to the time the forest administration officers can react to it. The time lag is relatively big and might take few days, as telecommunication services are costly and not readily available in rural Cambodia. Furthermore, there are only few officers that are responsible for sometimes hardly accessible areas. 34 In this context, the work of Community Forest Organization is further complicated if user groups are actively in-migrating from other communes or districts, as neither community members nor local administrative staff feel entitled to inhibit exploitation by "foreign" people from other communes and districts.
In CK the institutional settings offered under the new legislation also fail to achieve the goal of preserving forest resources. Here too, the main threat to forest areas is the conversion into agricultural land. 35 However, in contrast to KS, this conversion is not due to in-migration but a direct consequence of the scarcity of arable land in the village. During the last two years floods destroyed parts of the rice harvest in the village, encouraging people to look for new fields in locations that are less flood-prone and more reliable to generate sufficient income sources. Experiencing higher returns on the crops grown in the former forest area, more and more villagers put an effort to get access to parcels of this fertile land. Local villagers thus started with slash and burn agriculture and over time shifted agricultural activities from rice to cash cropping. However, some differentiation is necessary as poor people are not even able to invest time in slash and burn activities while still crucially depending on forest products. 36 They spend ever more time to generate the minimum amount needed for subsistence that was provided easily by the products from the forests in the past. The benefit streams out of the forest decrease the more the resource is getting scarcer. The study found people in CK relying mainly on forest products for livelihood generation to be the only ones whose well-being deteriorated over the last five years. In order to address the issue of deteriorating forest resources, local authorities decided to apply for a Community Forest Organization 37 in order to preserve the remaining forest in the area. As in KS, the Community Forest Organization in CK suffers from a lack of responsibility and from unclear local boundaries. In addition, authorities fail to cooperate with neighbouring villages using the same forest.
All facts together, in turn, result in an institutional situation that does not allow communities to effectively exclude anyone from extracting goods out of the natural resource base or to convert forest resources into arable land. Villagers often formulated access rules as "first come, first served" rules for their natural resources. 38 Even in cases when user communities have already been established and are setting rules, only rare events can be traced back in which trespassers have been detected. Even rarer events could be identified in which they were held responsible for their actions. Altogether, the institutional setting is getting close to an open access situation.
This rather disappointing sketch of the current situation, however, does not preclude the continued operation of traditional mechanisms in Cambodia to manage common natural resources effectively at a local level. In all of the four villages there have been traditional resource management institutions in place historically. However, in KS and CK villages indigenous responsibility has been handed over to an institution that replaces traditional mechanisms. Cambodian traditional natural resource management mechanisms also aim to achieve a sustainable use of natural 35 Large parts of the forest are already used for cash cropping (corn, cashew, and mango cultivation) and as rice fields. 36 Poor people are not able to invest time in slash and burn activities as they cannot rely on savings while at the same time being strongly dependent on income streams on a daily basis. Investing in land conversion takes too much time until these activities will be turned into income. 37 Until June 2007 the registration process was not finished.
resources: Local authorities' 39 elaborate solutions to resource threats and develop, revitalize, and try to enforce sets of rules that aim to overcome arising problems. 40 Traditional management also results in regular common activities such as lake excavations or dam building and maintenance, where all villagers are asked and expected to take part. Religious tradition is another norm and rule creating and enforcing mechanism that brings people together to prepare for festivities, allocate sacred sites, set up or renovate temporary huts, and clear the forest from shrub.
Once a rule is set, it applies for the villagers as well as for any outsider. Trespassers, when caught, are explained the rules as well as the reasons why the rule has been applied. The monitoring of compliance with the rules is done by all villagers, while the village leader is expected to take action if trespasser does not refrain from breaking these local rules. Action means mainly to report the incidents to the commune council or to the authorities responsible to sue the trespasser. There are no further enforcement mechanisms in place, resulting in a number of trespassers that do not abide by the rules. 41 However, the respect for village elders and religious beliefs 42 hinder most local people from breaking formulated rules. The villages LK and ST manage their resources only based on traditional, endogenous rules and enforcement mechanisms. The villages have a traceable history in cooperation, as they traditionally cultivate rice and are thus dependent on support from fellow villagers, for example, to transplant rice seedlings and for animal traction. Buddhist festivities bring people of surrounding villages together in the forest area to celebrate. Village authorities respond to changes in the resource base and in cases when problems occur. On all lands surrounding the villages, people have access rights to extract products for subsistence, no matter whether the land is privately or commonly owned. 43 In LK rules are in place to limit extraction rates that aim to keep the forest at its current size. Plans are underway to even increase the quality of the resource base: an enlargement of the local pond is planned to contribute additional income for subsistence through fishing. In ST local rules prohibit the use of certain fishing gear and the conversion of forests into arable land. Villagers act collectively to protect their resource base, 44 when resources are used as common property.
These examples describe different setups for natural resource management institutions and property rights enforcement mechanisms, and their different 39 This comprises mostly village leaders, respected village elders, and religious authorities. 40 Reacting to decreased fish stock, for example, they may set up rules listing exactly the kind of fishing equipment that is allowed to be used or must not be used in a local lake. Another response may be to ban harvesting bamboo for house construction when bamboo forests are threatened by overuse. 41 This is especially true for water resources where illegal fishing gear, such as explosives, will threaten the resource base. 42 Strong beliefs exist that a person disrupting "Neak Ta", the forest spirits, will suffer from ill health or bad harvests. 43 Collecting fuel wood, catching crabs in rice fields, etc. are allowed as long as these activities do not affect the harvest. After harvesting, the fields usually become common grazing grounds for livestock. 44 These activities include cutting shrub in the forest and the excavation of the lake to keep it from being overgrown.
outcomes. LK and ST are still traditionally managed, whereas CK and KS established newly offered external institutions (Fishery Communities and Community Forests) trying to make traditional use rights legally enforceable. Nevertheless, all village authorities feel vulnerable to interventions of higher ranking authorities. They feel unable to oppose plans interfering with their local management strategies, leaving formalized and traditional institutions vulnerable to external intervention and thus undermining the authorities' ability to enforce rules at local level.
As agriculture remains the main income source in Cambodian rural areas, scarce arable land resources, together with rapid population growth, put increasing pressure on natural resources as many farmers seek to transform so-called unproductive land 45 to add to their existing land holdings. As laws, decrees, and other legal texts set different prerequisites and incentives to establish private property rights and have been implemented and communicated to the local population incompletely, conflicts arise for common pool resources. 46 These conflicts have different impacts on people's livelihoods depending on the size of the land and the actors involved.
In the absence of cadastral records, land is often assumed to be state owned and is sold at a large scale without consulting local level administration about current uses, correct location, and spatial expansion (Zimmermann and Kruk, 2002; Bliss, 2005) . This gives space for unrestricted speculation often involving government officials, the military and Khmer, or expatriate businessmen. But villagers are also often unaware of state laws. This, in turn, causes conflicts between villagers and government bodies at all administrative levels. It is often not known by the villagers that natural resources are owned by the state and must not be converted to arable land.
The most severe consequence is a loss of these resources as a productive asset for the household or the village community as a whole. Such a loss might be temporary and only last as long as the conflict is resolved. However, it might also result in a complete loss of land as a productive asset due to decisions by local authorities, courts, or the exertion of power by local elites (such as forests converted into rubber plantations). In addition, conflict resolution processes tie up labor force and often substantial financial assets. 47 Conflicts over natural resources can usually only be solved at a district, provincial, or even the national level. Local villagers on their own are often unable to enforce their rights to a particular resource. Nevertheless, as usually quite a number of local resource users are affected by a conflict, they are able to pool resources and can lobby their local authorities or civil society organisations to take action on their behalf. Collective action might help to overcome not only natural 45 Land is often left unused when the household that owns the land lacks capital, labor force (for example, through illness or temporary migration) or seeds for planting in time. Forested land is also considered unproductive, once valuable woods have been logged. 46 There are conflicts about agricultural and homestead lands too, but the focus here will be on other natural resources. 47 Costs of conflict resolution include fees for administration and transportation costs. Both usually rise when conflict resolution is solved at higher administrative levels. In addition, conflicts also affect parties' self esteem and threaten their physical well-being when they turn violent. resource management problems but also be of importance to enforce rights on benefit streams out of the resources against. In the following section forms of collective action in rural Cambodia will be identified and factors that influence engagement in collective action will be analyzed.
Collective Action in Rural Cambodia
Even after the Pol Pot terror regime and civil war, people in Cambodia continue to cooperate in many ways, ranging from agricultural activities such as transplanting rice, to building social infrastructure such as schools, to membership in other associations, not necessarily with an economic focus. In all four villages a wide range of activities was identified in which collective action is practiced as an effort to improve rural livelihoods and deliver local goods with a public character. 48 In this study a broad definition is used to identify collective action. It is understood as the voluntary engagement of a group of people to reach a common goal. Villagers plan for and execute activities that serve not only the household but also a group of people or the village as a whole. 49 Figure 3 gives a first overview about the different domains of collective action and the frequency of help that is given to fellow villagers as percent of households engaging in the different activities. Patterns of help in the villages go beyond lines of kinship especially in cases where help is needed due to illness, funerals, and for communal work. Help for house construction or field work rather follows lines of affinity but still goes beyond the extended family. 48 Activities include spontaneous help after a house burns down (to build a shelter and provide clothes), over bilateral livestock sharing arrangements (animal traction for ploughing), and informal natural resource management, up to more formalized associations with written rules and constitutions. 49 Examples are road construction, building schools, transplanting rice, and contribututions for social events. Table 4 . The Classification Table highlights that the model successfully predicts 88.4 percent of the cases, that is if a household participates in community work or not. Under "Model Summary," we see that the -2 Log Likelihood statistic is 89.55. This statistic measures how the model predicts the decisions -the smaller the statistic, the better the model. Cox and Snell R 2 can be interpreted like the R 2 in a multiple regression, but cannot reach a maximum value of 1. The "Variables in the Regression" Table presents regression coefficients and odds ratios. B gives the natural logarithm of the odds ratio, and Exp(B) represents the predicted odds ratio for each variable. The Wald statistic tests the unique contribution of each predictor, holding the other predictors constant. Significance levels are given by the column p. They can be interpreted as follows: If Exp(B)>1, the explaining variable increases the probability of a household to switch to "yes", meaning to take part in common activities; if Exp(B)<1, the explaining variable increases the probability of an individual's "no", meaning no engagement in common activities. 50 As the sample size is relatively small, the prediction quality is low. Still, important insights can be derived. The household size and access to information on village matters increase the probability of participation in village activities, whereas an increase in wealth adds to the probability of not taking part in common activities. This is consistent with the observation that the wealthy buy themselves out from obligatory community work by hiring poorer villagers to do their part in the required activities. Village characteristics that have been included do have an impact on the probability that a household will take part in common activities: households in a village with traditional institutions have higher probability of acting collectively, whereas village market access significantly lowers a household's probability to take part in collective action. On the one hand, villages with better market access are also more accessible to government agencies and NGOs whose activities in the villages might crowd out collective action as they often employ villagers to build up common goods. 51 On the other hand, as main elements of collective action in rural Cambodia are concerned with road construction and accessibility to the village in general, villages with good market access might not need as much effort to maintain physical infrastructure compared to villages with poor accessibility. Only very small and non-significant effects were found for the other explanatory variables: the longer a household lives in the village (variable 'years lived in the village'), the more it will be willing to engage in collective action. Households that expect to get more involved in village institutions also contribute more. People attending village meetings, having higher knowledge on local rules, and generally behaving prosocial have a higher chance to take part in collective action. Variables that increase the probability of not taking part in common activities are 'years of migration' (the time a household spends outside the village), 'education,' and 'power to influence village decision making processes'. Again, the latter findings are not significant and thus hard to interpret.
In order to paint a more detailed picture of the results, some simple association measures are presented in table 5. It shows the strength of association between household's characteristics and the household's engagement in common activities as Cramer's V coefficient 52 for the strongest associations. 50 Exp(B) is interpreted as an odds ratio for main effects model. 51 The RGC program SEILA, for example, employs villagers to build and maintain streets. This is paid labor and is not considered collective action in this context. 52 The Cramer's V coefficient measures the strength of association of categorical variables, ranging from 0, no association, to 1, perfect association. The closer Cramer's V is to 1, the stronger is the association between the variables. In the literature, values between 0.1 and 0.2 indicates a weak association, and values between 0.2 and 0.4 indicates a moderate association (Rea and Parker, 1992) . Nevertheless, no direction of the association can be derived from Cramer's V. The strongest association was found for the variable 'years spent in the village'. The longer a household lives in a village the longer the household receives benefits from public goods provided by its fellow villagers: social ties improve and commitment to the village increases. People taking part in village meetings might be more committed to the village and thus inclined to take part in collective action on the village level. But the meetings themselves may help motivate people because development projects are announced in the meetings, and financial needs and labor requirements discussed. The variable 'household size' shows strong association with participation in communal work. A larger household is better able to spare a member from household activities to participate in collective projects. 53 Smaller households' participation in common activities can be costly, especially if the household depends on daily wage labor and cannot afford to take part in collective action that generates no direct payoffs.
Simple correlations ( Table 6 ) also indicate that landless and land-poor households are less likely to engage in formalized institutions for collective action such as cash associations or rice banks. The same is true for less educated households. Table 7 illustrates that less educated households are less likely to engage in associations. It plots the shares for each category of school education against the fact whether households expect to engage at less, the same or more associations. In the research sites 56.8 percent of the illiterate households and 57.1 percent of the households with one to three years schooling expect to become more engaged in associations, whereas 72.7 and 62.5 percent of the higher educated households expect more engagement. Illiterate or poorer people frequently feel themselves as "only ordinary villagers" who are not worth taking part in associations, unless they are explicitly invited by association leaders. Most of the reasons not to become a member of an association are mistrust and a lack of confidence. People often do not take part when association leaders support a political party or belong to an informal network of kinship and affinity that is different from the one with which the potential member is affiliated. In addition, landless and land-poor villagers are afraid their financial assets would not be sufficient to pay back loans when becoming members of cash associations or rice banks, or to pay regular membership fees. It is people owning middle-sized land parcels who are strongly engaged in these associations (Table  8) . They are also more likely to engage in more than one association, establishing more complex networks through cooperation with a stronger impact on local wellbeing. Every second household owning more than 4 hectares of land does not take part in any association. There are two reasons to opt out. First, people with large land holdings are not dependent on rice banks or cash associations. Their harvests guarantee enough income for consumption as well as for investments to crop in the next season. The second reason would be time restrictions. Agricultural activities are labor intense and time consuming. The larger the land holdings of a household, the more time members of that household spend with field work. The households will especially opt out, when association membership means engaging in time consuming activities (guarding natural resources, for example). However, there are exceptions. Empirical research in KS village shows that low engagement of middle-sized land owners in associations is due to a large number of immigrants; these purchase middle-sized land pieces without integrating completely into the village ( Table 9 ). As immigrants contribute to an ever increasing share of the total village population, they can be expected to establish their own associations in the future. In the village of ST no association is operating, even though a women's association formally exists. Households with a low human capital base are less likely to shape their livelihoods by taking part in collective decision making processes. Though they do take part in collective action, less educated people will not feel free to participate if they are not explicitly included by authorities due to their low self-confidence. The same is true for poorer people. They will not take part in decision-making processes unless local authorities include them. Table 10 illustrates a strong positive correlation of educational level, wealth, and power to influence village decision-making. Nevertheless, contentedness with decisions made for the village is evenly distributed among all households. As described above, poorer and less educated households reported not feeling capable to take part in decision making processes or to engage in formal institutions. Often, a certain portion of mistrust also keeps Cambodians from engaging in these activities. In order to substantiate these results from descriptive data analysis, economic field experiments on trust have been conducted in the villages. 56 The experiment's results are shown in Table 11 . People in all villages trusted their fellow villagers to some degree (as indicated by the fractions sent). People's trustworthiness (represented in the fractions returned) is low, and return ratios 57 vary across villages. Post-game interviews indicate that higher levels of fractions sent might be due to religious attitudes of solidarity as most individuals state fairness or fear of punishment being the main reasons to send an amount of money. 58 Only few 56 A detailed description of the game is given in the Annex. 57 The return ratio is calculated as share of the amount sent back by player B and the amount sent by player A (players A who sent 0 are not included as division by 0 is not defined). Return ratios smaller than 1.0 indicate that people who trusted their fellow villagers with money did lose part of the amount they sent. Return ratios higher than 1.0 show that players of group B share the surplus received through the design of the game. 58 This might be due to religious beliefs of punishment in the following life but might also be out of fear that their behavior will come to light after the game (torture during the Khmer rouge regime respondents mentioned the opportunity of extra gain as their predominant intention to send money to their counterparts. These attitudes would be expected to lead to similar levels in the fractions returned, as religious attitudes of solidarity or fear of punishment would also apply for players who return. Again, the post-game questionnaire sheds some light on the reasons behind the lack of reciprocity. People who did not or only returned small fractions assumed their counterparts to be wealthier and thus take the amount received as a gift. Religious attitudes have not been controlled for, as all participants are Buddhist.
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On an individual level, the household size has a significant negative impact on the individual's trust level, meaning individuals living in large families tended to send less to their counterparts than smaller households. 59 Looking at the research villages separately, CK shows lowest and LK the highest trust levels. In CK trust level decreases the more common activities an individual joined during a year's time span. This is due to the fact that most common activities 60 to improve local physical infrastructure are still perceived as forced labor. 61 It is noteworthy that in both villages with formal Community Forest or Fishery Community Organizations (CK, KS) trust is lower than in the two traditionally managed villages (LK, ST). The measure of the strength of association between an individual's trust level and traditional village institutions (Cramer's V) takes the value of 0.536.
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS
In all villages, natural resource degradation is observable and negatively affects the rural poor. Van Acker (1999) and others (World Bank, 2003b) already noted that resource degradation is severe, expecting a "total harvest approach" (van Acker, 1999; 5). Incomplete regulation and, in particular, weak enforcement mechanisms at all levels of jurisdictions were the major causes of resource degradation identified by Hach and Sothea (2004) . In addition, traditional succession schemes 62 together with high population growth put a significant pressure on the state of natural resources. The RGC tries to address resource degradation through Community Forest and Fishery Community Organizations. However, these included the threat that the Angka knows everything and would find out each and every lie). Another explanation might be recent history of forced collectivisation, where villagers were forced to contribute to common goals whereas free-riding has not been punished (Colletta and Cullen, 2000) . 59 Excess bonding social capital can be responsible for exclusive, sealing-off networks (Putnam, 1995) ; in the case of excess bonding capital, the extended household acts as the social network that is more capable to exclude outsiders the bigger it is. Bigger households are thus better able to rely on their members such as for child care, borrowing money, or help for field activities. Smaller households are, on the other hand, much more dependent on bridging social capital to support their livelihoods. 60 The term "common activities" is used here to differentiate it from the voluntary collective action discussed earlier. 61 In the 2005 household survey only 9.7 percent of the interviewed reported to take part in common activities on a voluntary basis in CK. In the other villages an average of 85.47 percent of the individuals reported to work voluntarily for the village. 62 Traditionally, the children "inherit" part of their parents land when they get married to start their own household. With high population growth the sizes of the land plots that young couples are getting are smaller and are often not sufficient to sustain the family. Thus, new strips of land are cleared to generate sufficient income. approaches face several obstacles. Slow registering processes lead to uncertainties on how to apply rules for Community Organizations. Most of the areas that are still forested land are difficult to assess, thus complicating an exact definition of boundaries of the resource unit. As the forest administration is reported to lack sufficient human and financial resources, it is unable to react timely and effectively to requests of the communes (EIC, 2005) . Calavan et al. (2004) and van Acker (1999) find corruption as one of the factors that slows down the registration process 63 at the local level. 64 Low cooperation between villages leaves communities unable to enforce rules set for a resource used by different villages. This might be due to low levels of trust observed in the villages during field experiments in 2006. 65 Different studies (such as Colletta and Cullen, 2000; Pellini and Ayres, 2005) find that bridging and linking social capital is rather low in Cambodia. Following Uphoff's (2000) definition of trust as "essential 'glue' of society" (2000:227), trust is necessary to build up and sustain long term cooperation. Given the low degrees of trust found in the villages of this case study (and especially in those with Community Forest and Fishery Community Organisations), it can be assumed that if villagers that do not even consider their fellow villagers trustworthy, they would be even less likely to trust from neighbouring villages. Observed differences in the ability to coordinate within the village (as opposed to among villages) can be attributed partly to a strict topdown leadership. It would also be an important issue for further research to investigate if religion influences attitudes and what kind of religious attitudes influence in turn the differences in trust and trustworthiness among the Cambodian rural population. Another reason for unsuccessful natural resource management can be attributed to the lack of trust hindering people to cooperate in order to protect the resource. In a cross-country study Zak and Knack (2001) find low trust levels in countries were political environments are unstable and social heterogeneity is high. Experimental evidence from the villages shows lower levels of trust in those villages where authorities chose to establish new property rights-related institutions. In fact, there is a strong positive association of an individual's trust level with traditional village institutions
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In rural Cambodia property rights on natural resources such as local forests, fish ponds, lakes, water streams, or harvested fields are normally commonly owned, used, and managed. This makes effective collective action a precondition for sustainable resource management as well as income generation and asset built-up for the rural poor. For a country which has been disrupted for decades by war, genocide, and forced collectivization and is still characterized by fragile or even 63 Commonly reported corruption techniques include demands of administrative staff for extra payments for "express services" (to speed up administrative processes) or gasoline expenditures for staff that need to travel to the villages. 64 At a larger scale, Global Witness (2007) reported corruption to be a major obstacle for sustainable resource management throughout Cambodia. 65 There is some experimental evidence that people in CK are less trustful than villagers in the other villages.
weak government institutions putting pressure on the rule of law, legal security, and human rights enforcement, it is not surprising that both property rights systems and collective action do not yet fulfil the requirements and expectations given to them either by research, civil society organisations, or donors.
The ongoing devolution process for natural resources in Cambodia might be considered as premature and short-sighted for its immediate impact on collective action and can even inhibit or even undermine expected sustainable use patterns. Under current devolution policies, important monitoring and enforcement mechanisms executed by a still weak, though existent local forest administration are removed abruptly after responsibility for resource management is handed over to local Community Forest or Fishery Community Organizations. Yet these communities are neither officially acknowledged by the government nor able to execute the whole spectrum of responsibilities assigned to them. The result is that an institutional vacuum emerges, which does not favor of the poor.
For formal institutions to be efficient to manage the local commons, the concrete procedures and sequencing to formulate and enforce by-laws and statutes integrating both guiding principles of a devolving state and traditional local rules and enforcement mechanisms should be given more consideration. Uncertainties on the part of both the government and the local user groups will have to be diminished. An important first step will be to reduce existing uncertainties about village or commune boundaries, responsibilities, and procedures to be taken in case of violation of rules. However, it will only be successful if different line agencies, such as a decentralized Ministry of Land or Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for Forestry and Fishery, support villagers in identifying their boundaries, demarcating them and documenting the results in a joint effort. Enforcement will only work at the interface of old established informal and newly developed formal institutions if administrative procedures are transparent regarding how to fine violators of common property rules: to what degree can peer pressure be applied, how to coordinate enforcement not only within but between villages, and when to hand over power of decision making to the judiciary.
An immediate removal of tasks and power to monitor and enforce sustainable resource use from line ministries and other state agencies to local users cannot be accomplished overnight in a country that is ridden by mistrust, forced settlement in the villages, and a long period of interrupting the development of social cohesion and capital. In addition to the local users' efforts to enforce rights, those ministries should not remove their officers from their responsibilities but rather define their tasks newly as to cooperate and support local Community Organizations.
In particular for the rural poor any participation in organisations to foster collective action and to govern the commons is quite costly: activities are time consuming, direct compensation cannot be expected, and unbalanced reciprocity has often not yet been proved to work for them. Although the poor in rural Cambodia might profit most from protecting their local commons, they are not necessarily the ones able to defend their own interests effectively within village organizations. The poor remain dependent on the more affluent in the villages to initiate and continue cooperation to protect their interests. As the poor are often those with no formal education and a weak human capital base, and without or with very little land, they are less likely to get involved in formalized groups which have been mainly externally established to support agricultural activities. However, they participate in informal gatherings and groups in the village as an entry point for further cooperation. There are indications that the poor are not "lost" for collective action and that different ties and links exist offering a potential to be strengthened by external temporary support by NGOs or other initiatives. However, empirical results show that in the rural fabric the poor are more likely to comply with rules and mechanisms only but not to take deliberate action to shape them and to defend them actively.
Complementary to this, the role of religious festivities and Buddhist values and norms needs further consideration. Jointly exercised religious activities are an instrument to enhance cooperation in and between villages, and are explicitly used by political entrepreneurs and local leaders as a means to protect natural capital and to contribute to social cohesion and trust. Built on religious initiatives and the overall imperative of harmony, people start to communicate experiences where collective action had been successful to protect their interests against government, military, large scale investors or others. They do not actively protest and demonstrate but begin by formulating petitions and memorandums to raise awareness of their problems, to address conflicts, and ask for external support. Although these activities might be assessed as rather defensive and "shy," they should also be regarded as a starting point to rely more on collective action to protect property rights and to make use of reformed property rights systems which allows for new forms of collective action to combat poverty in rural areas.
APPENDIX A.
Rules of the Trust Game
During the experiment the group of players has been divided into two sub-groups: The "first-movers", here referred to as players A, and the "responders", here referred to as players B. Each player A is coupled with a player B but the exact match is unknown to the players, meaning no player A knows who is player B he or she is playing the game. To start the game each player A receives an amount of money as initial endowment. Now, player A can decide to keep or (partially) send his endowment to his unknown counterpart in group B. The amount sent by player A is tripled and given to player B on top of his or her initial endowment being identical to that of group A. Now the player of group B owns the tripled fraction that payer A sent plus his initial endowment. She or he has to decide whether to sent any amount back or keep the whole sum. After player B has made his decision, the money he or she sent back is given to player A and the game ends. Players A have, thus, to decide whether to trust their counterparts in group B: the higher the fraction of money sent, the higher the trust in their counterpart that their investment (the fraction sent) will pay off. The Nash equilibrium for selfish preferences is to pass nothing, since a self-interested person would return nothing of the amount received.
Notes:
1) All numbers on Table have been converted to US system of notation (such as 0.66 for decimals).
2) column for degrees of freedom was deleted since it is a chi-squared test 3) Is significance column reporting the p?
